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Abstract
Failure is embarrassing. In gambles involving both skill and chance, we show that a strategic desire
to avoid appearing unskilled generates behavioral anomalies that are typically explained by prospect
theory’s concepts of loss aversion, probability weighting, and framing eﬀects. Loss aversion arises
because losing any gamble, even a friendly bet with little or no money at stake, reﬂects poorly on the
decision maker’s skill. Probability weighting emerges because winning a gamble with a low probability
of success is a strong signal of skill, while losing a gamble with a high probability of success is a
strong signal of incompetence. Framing matters when there are multiple equilibria and the framing
of a gamble aﬀects beliefs, e.g., when someone takes a “dare” rather than admit a lack of skill. The
analysis is based on models from the career concerns literature and is closely related to early social
psychology models of risk taking. The results provide an alternative perspective on the existence of
prospect theory behavior in economic, ﬁnancial, and managerial decisions where both skill and chance
are important. We identify speciﬁc situations where skill signaling makes opposite predictions than
prospect theory, allowing for tests between the strategic and behavioral approaches to understanding
risk.
JEL Classiﬁcation Categories: D81; D82; C92; G11
Key Words: Prospect theory; career concerns; probability weighting; loss aversion; framing eﬀects; dare
taking; embarrassment aversion
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Most risky decisions involve both skill and chance. Success is therefore doubly fortunate in that it brings
both material gain and an enhanced reputation for skill, while failure is doubly unfortunate. Often the
reputational eﬀects are more important than the direct material gain or loss. For instance, the manager of
a successful project wins the conﬁd e n c eo fs u p e r i o r st oo v e r s e em o r ep r o j e c t s ,w h i l et h em a n a g e ro faf a i l e d
project is viewed as incompetent and loses future opportunities. In other cases the reputational eﬀects are
less important but still of some concern. For instance, an investor who picks a successful stock enjoys the
esteem of friends and family, while an investor who chooses poorly looks like a foolish loser.
The idea that failure is embarrassing and that decision makers might choose between risky actions
to limit embarrassment is emphasized in the early social psychology literature on achievement motiva-
tion (Atkinson, 1957), and similar ideas appear in the literatures on self-esteem (James, 1890) and self-
handicapping (Jones and Berglas, 1978). More formally, the literature on the career concerns of managers
analyzes how the interaction between skill and chance aﬀects Bayesian updating of a manager’s skill (Holm-
strom, 1982/1999). This literature ﬁnds that the incentive to avoid looking unskilled can explain a wide
range of seemingly irrational behaviors by managers.
In this paper we use the formal approach of the career concerns literature to reexamine the role of
embarrassment and loss of self-image in standard problems involving decision under risk. We ﬁnd results
that are consistent with the principle insights of the early social psychology literatures, and that extend
these insights in novel ways. Moreover, we show a close connection between these approaches which are
consistent with expected utility maximization, and the non-expected utility approach of prospect theory
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). We concentrate on identifying what
violations of expected utility will appear to arise if a rational decision maker is concerned with appearing
skilled, but is instead modeled as only caring about immediate monetary payoﬀs.
We show that skill signaling leads to a set of behaviors that, depending on the information environment,
largely overlap with prospect theory’s main concepts of loss aversion, probability weighting, and framing
eﬀects (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Loss aversion refers to the idea that
the utility function is kinked at the status quo wealth level so that utility falls more steeply in losses than it
rises in gains (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Gambles with a roughly equal chance of winning or losing can
therefore have substantial risk premia, even for small stakes where a standard smooth utility function would
predict near risk neutrality (Pratt, 1964; Rabin, 2000; Rabin and Thaler, 2001). Probability weighting
refers to the idea that decision makers violate expected utility theory by overweighting low probabilities.
It can explain the simultaneous purchase of lottery tickets and insurance (Friedman and Savage, 1948),
the Allais paradox (Allais, 1953), and the preference for long shots in horse races and other gambling
environments (Thaler and Ziemba, 1988). Finally, framing eﬀects arise when diﬀerent choices result from
a simple change in the presentation of choices (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981).
To analyze the role of skill signaling, we follow the career concerns literature in investigating two types
of skill. First, with “performance skill” some decision makers face better odds of success than other less
1skilled decision makers. For instance, a project might be more likely to succeed under a skilled manager.
Performance skill has been used to understand “rat race” career incentives (Holmstrom, 1982/1999), ex-
cessive risk-taking (Holmstrom and Costa, 1986), and corporate conformism (Zwiebel, 1995). Second, with
“evaluation skill” some decision makers are better at identifying the exact odds of a gamble than their less
skilled counterparts. For instance, a skilled manager might be better at choosing promising projects, or a
skilled broker might have a talent for identifying proﬁtable companies. Evaluation skill has been used to
understand distorted investment decisions (Holmstrom, 1982/1999), herding (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990),
anti-herding (Avery and Chevalier, 1999), the sunk cost fallacy (Kanodia, Bushman, and Dickhaut, 1989),
conservatism and overconﬁdence (Prendergast and Stole, 1996), and political correctness (Morris, 2001).
We diﬀer from most of the career concerns literature in that we do not explicitly model the details of the
career environment. Instead we derive general results for situations where individuals are “embarrassment
averse” in the same pattern as is normally assumed for risk aversion regarding wealth. That is, their utility
is increasing in their expected skill, and they particularly dislike being thought of as unskilled. Such a
pattern could reﬂect a simple desire to avoid embarrassment or maintain one’s own self-image. Or, from
a career concerns perspective, the pattern arises if future income is a linear function of estimated skill
and people are risk averse with respect to wealth. It also arises if future income is a concave function of
estimated skill because, for instance, the probability of maintaining employment is a concave function of
performance (Chevalier and Ellison, 1999). The value of our approach is that the results can be applied to
any environment that generates future income based on success or failure in a pattern consistent with the
general conditions of embarrassment aversion.
Prospect theory’s concepts of loss aversion, probability weighting, and framing eﬀects were originally
identiﬁed in laboratory experiments, but have since become widespread tools for analyzing economic,
ﬁnancial, and managerial behavior in environments where the career concerns literature has also shown
a strong role for skill signaling.1 Our results indicate that the behavioral approach of prospect theory
and the strategic approach of skill signaling provide very similar predictions in these environments. This
overlap can be seen as mutually reinforcing — the theoretical results of skill signaling provide an underlying
strategic foundation for the behavioral predictions of prospect theory, and the empirical results of prospect
theory indicate that decision makers are capable of understanding and even internalizing the logic of skill
signaling. However, there are important situations in which the predictions of prospect theory and skill
signaling diverge, so determining whether behavioral or strategic eﬀects are driving behavior in particular
situations is often important. We discuss this i s s u em o r ei nS e c t i o n4a n di nt h ec o n c l u s i o n .
To see how skill signaling leads to similar predictions as prospect theory, ﬁrst consider loss aversion.
When there is a performance skill component to a gamble, losing implies that there is a good chance that
the decision maker bungled the gamble, and when there is an evaluation skill component, losing implies
that the decision maker might have unwisely taken a gamble that had worse than expected odds. In either
1See Camerer (2000) and Barberis and Thaler (2001) for some applications of prospect theory in these areas. One indicator
of how widely prospect theory is applied is the fact that Kahneman and Tversky (1979) is typically ranked as the ﬁrst or
second most cited paper in economics.
2case, losing reﬂects poorly on the decision maker’s skill, so if the decision maker is risk averse with respect
to skill estimates, then she is more averse to gambling than pure risk aversion regarding monetary payoﬀs
would predict. Since losing even a “friendly bet” with no money at stake is embarrassing, this eﬀect does
not disappear as the stakes of the gamble become smaller,2 so the utility function in wealth will appear to
be kinked at the status quo, i.e., the decision maker will appear to be loss averse.
Regarding probability weighting, prospect theory argues that decision-makers exhibit a “four-fold pat-
tern” of behavior in which they tend to favor long-shots but also avoid near sure-things, and to buy
insurance to protect against unlikely losses even as they will take risky chances to win back large losses.3
To capture this observed pattern, probability weighting as developed most fully in “cumulative prospect
theory” (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Prelec, 1998) assumes that people violate expected utility maxi-
mization by overweighting small probability gains (such as taking a 10% chance of winning $100 over $10
for sure) and underweighting high probability gains (such as taking $90 for sure over a 90% chance of
winning $100), and by overweighting low probability losses (such as paying $10 for sure rather than risking
a 10% chance of losing $100), and underweighting high probability losses (such as risking a 90% chance of
losing $100 rather than paying $90 for sure).
From the perspective of skill signaling, the four-fold pattern in gains and losses can be interpreted more
simply as overweighting of small probabilities of success (e.g., favoring long shots and taking chances to
win back large losses) and underweighting of high probabilities of success (e.g., avoiding near sure things
and buying insurance). For either performance skill or evaluation skill, we ﬁnd that losing a gamble that
is known to have a low probability of success is less embarrassing than losing a gamble where success is
expected, so lower probability gambles are favored. When success is unlikely, failure is common but only
slightly reduces the perceived skillfulness of the decision maker because both skilled and unskilled decision
makers are expected to fail. But when success is likely, failure is rare but far more embarrassing because
a person who fails is probably unskilled. Embarrassment averse decision makers are therefore more willing
to take a chance on gambles that observers recognize are long shots, and reluctant to take gambles where
success is expected.
For gambles involving performance skill, the preference for long shots is strengthened by the presence
of private information held by the decision maker about her own skill. Failure to take a gamble can then be
seen as an admission that the decision maker lacks conﬁdence in her own skill, so the decision maker faces
pressure to risk failure rather than directly admit her incompetence by refusing to gamble. For gambles
that are known to be long shots there is little embarrassment in losing, so the decision maker is better oﬀ
taking the gamble if the expected monetary return is not too unfavorable. In contrast, for gambles that
2This is consistent with Schlaifer’s (1969, p.161) suggestion that in some cases “nonmonetary consequences” of losing may
explain high risk premia for small gambles.
3“Original prospect theory” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) assumes that the utility function is convex in losses and
concave in gains, implying the simpler pattern that decision makers are risk loving in gambles that involve potential losses
and risk averse in gambles that involve potential gains. Applications of prospect theory often allow for interactions between
both patterns, but in this paper we concentrate on the four-fold pattern. For an analysis of how concern for status can
generate a convex-concave utility function, see Harbaugh and Kornienko (2001).
3are recognized to be near sure things, taking the gamble involves substantial risk of embarrassment, so the
decision maker is often better oﬀ refusing the gamble.
For gambles involving evaluation skill, the preference for long shots is strengthened if the outcome of a
gamble is observable even when the decision maker turns it down. In this case the decision maker cannot
simply refuse to take the gamble and prevent the observer from learning about her skill. If the gamble is
refused, a good outcome is a strong indication that the decision maker failed to recognize that the gamble
had better than expected odds. For low probability gambles this possibility is more embarrassing than
taking the gamble and losing, so the decision maker will take the gamble if the expected monetary return is
not too negative. The opposite situation arises with high probability gambles. If such a gamble is refused,
little about the decision maker’s skill is revealed from the outcome because the good outcome is likely
regardless of whether the gamble’s true odds were slightly better or worse than expected. The danger from
taking the gamble and losing is greater, so high probability gambles are less desirable than pure monetary
considerations would imply.
Regarding framing eﬀects, multiple equilibria typically exist depending on whether the observer expects
the decision maker to gamble or not, and depending on what the observer believes about the decision
maker’s skill if she unexpectedly takes a diﬀerent choice. If refusal to take a gamble is interpreted as an
admission of being unskilled, then even an unskilled decision maker might be dared into gambling. Since
there are multiple equilibria, contextual cues can help indicate the player’s intentions (Schelling, 1960),
and in particular the framing of the question is likely to be an important source of information about the
observer’s expectations. Prospect theory ﬁnds that decision makers tend to be risk averse when the framing
of the gamble portrays losing rather than winning as the status quo reference point, and risk loving in the
opposite case. From a skill signaling perspective, if losing is portrayed as the reference point then taking
a ﬁxed sum instead of the gamble is as an improvement over the reference point, so refusing the gamble is
unlikely to be viewed negatively. But if winning is portrayed as the reference point, then taking a ﬁxed sum
instead of the gamble is worse than the reference point, so the decision maker has reason to expect that
refusing the gamble will be viewed as an admission of being unskilled. These beliefs imply that gambling
is less likely in the former case than the latter case, which is consistent with prospect theory.
The existence of multiple equilibria also implies a role for cultural factors in determining when gambling
is more or less likely. If observers expect some groups to try to prove their skill and others not to, or expect
diﬀerent groups to prove their skill in diﬀerent environments, behavior can result which conﬁrms the beliefs.
For instance, it is documented that men take riskier investments than women do (Jianakoplos and Bernasek,
1998), invest as if they are overconﬁdent (Barber and Odean, 2001), and generally appear to be less risk
averse (Eckel and Grossman, 2003; Croson and Gneezy, 2004). Rather than being solely or primarily due
to underlying diﬀerences in risk attitudes or conﬁdence, this pattern might arise from diﬀerent equilibrium
beliefs among observers about how members of each group try to prove their abilities. That is, if observers
expect men but not women to take risky actions, then the negative inference from not taking a gamble is
s m a l l e rf o rt h el a t t e rg r o u p ,s ot h eb e l i e f sc a nb es e l f - f u l ﬁlling.
These results show a close connection between the predictions of prospect theory and skill signaling,
4and also indicate that skill signaling may be related to other risk-taking behavior not captured by current
models. In the following section we provide an introductory example, and then in Section 3 we develop a
more formal model which considers the existence of multiple equilibria and provides results in terms of risk
premia. Section 3 also includes two natural extensions of the model. Section 4 relates the results in more
detail to prospect theory, and also shows how the results relate to other models, including achievement
motivation, self-esteem, self-handicapping, disappoint aversion, and regret theory. Section 5 concludes the
paper.
2 Introductory Example
Consider a gamble with two outcomes, “win” or “lose”, taken by a decision maker whose is either skilled
“s” or unskilled “u”. For this example the decision maker does not have any private information about
her own skill so that the act of taking a gamble is not itself informative of skill. The probability of being




=P r [ s]+
Pr[win,s] − Pr[s]Pr[win]
Pr[win]
=P r [ s]+
Pr[win,s] − Pr[s]Pr[win,s] − Pr[s]Pr[win,u]
Pr[win]
=P r [ s]+
Pr[u]Pr[win,s] − Pr[s]Pr[win,u]
Pr[win]




Similarly, the probability of being skilled conditional on losing is




Assuming that the “skill gap” Pr[win|s] − Pr[win|u] is positive, the prior skill estimate Pr[s]i su p d a t e d
favorably when the decision maker wins and unfavorably when the decision maker loses, and the updating
is stronger the larger is the skill gap and the weaker is the the prior skill estimate, i.e., the closer is Pr[s]
to 1/2.
To see how such updating can aﬀect behavior, suppose that the decision maker’s utility is a function
of both wealth and of her estimated skill by an observer, who could be the decision maker herself if self-
esteem is important.4 Assuming that the two components of utility are additively separable and letting v
represent the skill estimate component, if v is concave then the decision maker prefers that the observer
maintains the prior skill estimate Pr[s] rather than risk the lower estimate Pr[s|lose]. In particular, since
Pr[win]Pr[s|win]+P r [ lose]Pr[s|lose]=P r [ s], for v00 < 0,
v(Pr[s]) > Pr[win]v(Pr[s|win]) + Pr[lose]v(Pr[s|lose])
4As we discuss in Section 4, the issue of why self-esteem might aﬀect behavior is addressed formally by Benabou and Tirole
(2002).
5Figure 1: Impact of winning and losing on estimated skill and expected utility
so concern for appearing skilled leads a decision maker to be more wary of gambles than pure monetary
considerations would suggest. As the monetary size of the gamble becomes smaller, any risk aversion with
respect to the monetary component of utility should asymptotically disappear for a smooth utility function,
but the fear of looking unskilled remains even for a “friendly bet” with no money at stake.5 Therefore,
embarrassment aversion can provide a basis for prospect theory’s idea of loss aversion that is consistent
with a standard smooth utility function.6
Now consider how the decision maker’s attitude toward a gamble is aﬀected by the odds of the gamble.
From (1) and (2), for a given skill gap Pr[win|s]−Pr[win|u], both Pr[s|win]a n dP r [ s|lose] are decreasing in
Pr[win], so the higher is Pr[win], the weaker is the favorable updating and the stronger is the unfavorable
updating. Therefore, when a gamble is a “long shot” (Pr[win] is low) the decision maker has little to fear
from losing and a lot to gain from winning. And when a gamble is a “near sure thing” (Pr[win]i sh i g h )
the decision maker has little to gain and a lot to lose. More generally, if the skill gap depends on Pr[win],
as is necessary to keep Pr[win|s]a n dP r [ win|u] bounded in [0,1] as Pr[win] approaches 0 or 1, then these
updating patterns hold as long as the skill gap does not change too rapidly as Pr[win]r i s e s . 7
To see these updating patterns, consider Figure 1(a) which shows the probability of being skilled
when the prior is Pr[s]=1 /2 and the skill gap for any gamble takes the form Pr[win|s] − Pr[win|u]=
5In practice the skill gap itself is likely to shrink as the size of the gamble shrinks because the decision maker cares less
about the outcome. This idea appears in career concerns models where decision makers devote more resources to evaluating or
performing well at larger gambles (Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole, 1999; Milbourn, Shockley, and Thakor, 2001). However,
given a concern for appearing skilled, there is no reason to assume that the skill gap should go to zero.
6The issue of reputational risk appears in various contexts in the career concerns literature starting with Holmstrom
(1982/1999), but the connection with loss aversion does not appear to have been noted previously.
7From (1), winning leads to weaker favorable updating as Pr[win] increases if (Pr[win|s] − Pr[win|u])/Pr[win] is decreasing
in Pr[win], and from (2), losing leads to stronger unfavorable updating as Pr[win] increases if (Pr[win|s] − Pr[win|u])/(1 −
Pr[win]) is increasing in Pr[win].
62Pr[win]Pr[lose]. This simple formulation, which ensures that Pr[win|s] < 1a n dP r [ lose|u] > 0a sP r [ win]
approaches 1 or 0, is symmetric in that the skill gap is the same for a gamble with probability Pr[win]=p
and a gamble with probability Pr[lose]=p.8 As we will see in Section 4.2, this formulation is implicitly
assumed by the achievement motivation literature. When Pr[win] is low, winning has a large impact on es-
timated skill as seen from the divergence of the top line Pr[s|win] from the center line representing expected
skill, Pr[s|win]Pr[win]+Pr[s|bad]Pr[bad]=P r [ s]=1 /2, while losing has only a small impact as seen from
t h ec l o s e n e s so ft h eb o t t o ml i n eP r [ s|lose] to expected skill. Low probability gambles therefore present a
chance of standing out with little downside risk. Conversely, when Pr[win] is high, winning has only a
small impact on estimated skill whereas losing has a large impact. Such gambles oﬀer little opportunity
to prove the sender’s skill but carry substantial danger of embarrassment. In the ﬁgure a gamble with
Pr[win]=.2 generates expected skill from winning of Pr.2[s|win]=1 /2+((2(.2)(.8))/(.2))(1/2)(1/2) = .9
and expected skill from losing of Pr.2[s|lose]=1 /2 − ((2(.2)(.8))/(.8))(1/2)(1/2) = .4, while a gamble
with Pr[win]=.8 generates, by similar calculations, expected skill from winning of Pr.8[s|win]=.6a n d
expected skill from losing of Pr.8[s|lose]=.1.
The prospect theory literature and other literatures ﬁnd that decision makers tend to be more wary
of near sure things relative to long shots, which is consistent with this pattern that losing is more em-
barrassing for high probability gambles. However, even though losing at a near sure thing implies severe
embarrassment, losing occurs only rarely, so it is not immediately clear whether decision makers will be
more wary of such gambles. As we show in the next section, a near sure thing has more “downside risk”
(Whitmore 1970; Menezes, Geiss, and Tressler, 1980), so a suﬃcient condition for the decision maker to
prefer the long shot is that she is downside risk averse with respect to the observer’s estimate of her skill,
v0 > 0, v00 < 0, and v000 > 0, a standard assumption for risk aversion with respect to monetary outcomes.9
As we discuss in Section 4, this may provide an expected utility basis for the probability weighting phe-
nomenon identiﬁed in the prospect theory literature and formalizes a basic insight behind the achievement
motivation and self-handicapping literatures.
The eﬀect of downside risk on expected utility is seen in Figure 1(b) for a constant relative risk aversion
function v(x)=−1/x.10 Skill estimates from winning and losing for the Pr[win]=.2 gamble (ﬂatter line)
and the Pr[win]=.8 gamble (steeper line) are given. In each case estimated skill is Pr[s]=1 /2 on average,
but the downside risk is clearly much higher for the higher probability gamble. If we make the simplifying
assumption that the utility function is linear in wealth, the risk premium for a gamble is just the diﬀerence
8As long as the skill gap has the form Pr[win|s]−Pr[win|u]=αPr[win]Pr[lose]f o rα ∈ [0,2] the posterior skill estimates
are linear in Pr[win]a ss e e ni nF i g u r e1 ( a ) . T h ec a s eα = 2 represents the largest skill gap consistent with Pr[win|s]a n d
Pr[lose|u] remaining bounded in [0,1].
9Note that absolute risk aversion, −v00/v0,i sd e c r e a s i n gi f

(v00)2 − v0v000
/(v0)2 < 0, which, if v0 > 0a n dv00 < 0, requires
v000 > 0. Decreasing absolute risk aversion implies that the demand for risky assets increases with wealth (Pratt, 1964) and
that consumers engage in precautionary savings (Kimball, 1990). It is satisﬁed by most standard utility functions.
10For a CRRA function v(x)=x1−a/(1 − a) this corresponds to a relative risk aversion parameter of a =2 ,w h e r e a sa
log utility function corresponds to a = 1 and a square root utility function to a =1 /2. Typical estimates of risk aversion
with respect to wealth, which may be confounded by embarrassment aversion, range from a = 2 upwards. Note that v0 > 0,
v00 < 0, and v000 > 0f o ra l la>0.
7between v(1/2) and the expected value of v from the gamble. As seen in the ﬁgure, the risk premium is
over six times larger for the Pr[win]=.8 gamble than for the Pr[win]=.2 gamble.
I nt h ef o l l o w i n gs e c t i o nw ee x a m i n eam o r ef o r m a lm o d e lw h e r ew ea l l o wt h ed e c i s i o nm a k e rt oh a v es o m e
private information about her own ability (performance skill) and/or about the gamble itself (evaluation
skill). We show that the tendency to favor low probability gambles continues to hold, and is strengthened by
two eﬀects. First, when the decision maker has some private information about her ability, refusing to take
a gamble can be seen as acknowledging one’s own weakness. Therefore, for a suﬃciently low probability
gamble where the embarrassment from taking the gamble and losing is small, the risk premium is negative
rather than positive. Second, when the decision maker has some private information about the gamble,
rejecting a gamble that ultimately succeeds reﬂects unfavorably on the decision maker’s judgement. This
is more dangerous than gambling and losing for a low probability gamble, so the risk premium is negative
for a suﬃciently low probability gamble.
3 The Model
We consider a generalization of the above example that allows for both performance skill and evaluation
skill. A decision maker faces a gamble with payoﬀ x ∈ {lose,win} ⊂ R where lose (“losing” or “failure”)
is strictly less than win (“winning” or “success”). The decision maker is of skill q ∈ {u,s} ⊂ R where u
(“unskilled”) is strictly less than s (“skilled”). The decision maker does not know her skill q but has an
unveriﬁable private signal θ ∈ {b,g} ⊂ R where the probability of winning is higher given a “good” signal g
than a “bad” signal b,P r [ win|g] > Pr[win|b]. The probability of winning is increasing in skill, Pr[win|s] ≥
Pr[win|u], and when it is strictly increasing we say the gamble has “performance skill”. The informativeness
of the signal θ regarding the probability of winning is also increasing in skill, Pr[win|s,g] − Pr[win|u,g] ≥
Pr[win|s,b] − Pr[win|u,b], and when it is strictly increasing we say the gamble has “evaluation skill”.
We assume Pr[win|s,g] − Pr[win|u,g] > 0 but do not restrict Pr[win|s,b] − Pr[win|u,b], which can be
negative if performance skill is suﬃciently strong. Performance (evaluation) skill is “pure” if there is no
evaluation (performance) skill and Pr[s|g] > (=)Pr[s|b]. The joint distribution F(x,q,θ) has full support
on {lose,win}×{u,s}×{b,g}.11 The decision maker’s strategy is to accept or reject the gamble at a given
price z ∈ R. Her wealth is normalized to zero.
After the decision maker accepts or rejects the gamble, an observer observes the decision and the
outcome of the gamble if it is accepted. The observer’s only role is to estimate the decision maker’s skill
q given all available information Ω. The observer could be an employer, the market more generally, a
potential mate, or even the decision maker herself if self-esteem is important. To simplify the presentation
we normalize type u =0a n ds =1s ot h a tE[q|Ω]=P r [ s|Ω]. The decision maker’s utility is a quasilinear
function of wealth Y and her estimated skill by the observer, U = Y + v(Pr[s|Ω]) where v is thrice-
diﬀerentiable on (0,1). We are particularly interested in cases where a better skill estimate is preferred,
v0 > 0, where the decision maker is risk averse with respect to skill estimates, v00 < 0, and where this
11Therefore neither the outcome x nor signal θ is fully revealing of skill q.
8aversion is stronger at lower estimates, v000 > 0. The utility function is “reduced form” in that we do not
explicitly model why the decision maker is concerned with appearing skilled. The quasilinearity assumption
simpliﬁes the analysis by allowing us to isolate the eﬀect of embarrassment aversion on risk premia. In
practice risk premia are likely to be higher due to regular risk aversion regarding wealth.
Our equilibrium concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium with D1-proof beliefs (Cho and Kreps, 1987).
Therefore we assume that the expected skill Pr[s|Ω] by the observer is based on Bayes’ Rule for play on
the equilibrium path, and that the observer believes any deviation from the equilibrium path is by the type
who beneﬁts from such a deviation for the largest range of responses by the observer. The D1 reﬁnement
picks a unique type in our context and therefore simpliﬁes the presentation while also highlighting the fact
that the results do not depend on arbitrary choices of observer beliefs. In particular, the D1 reﬁnement
implies that if a decision maker is not expected to gamble and unexpectedly gambles then the observer
believes that she has good news (θ = g), and that if a decision maker is expected to gamble and does not
then the observer believes that she has bad news (θ = b).12
We restrict our attention to pure strategy equilibria. First consider a separating equilibrium in which
a decision maker with good news gambles and a decision maker with bad news does not. Generalizing (1)
and (2), if a gamble is accepted the expected skill conditional on x and the equilibrium belief that θ = g is




and if a gamble is rejected the expected skill given equilibrium the belief that θ = b is just Pr[s|b]. The
payoﬀ for type θ from gambling is therefore E[x|θ]+E[v(Pr[s|x,g])|θ] − z,w h e r eE[v(Pr[s|x,g])|θ]=
Pr[win|θ]v(Pr[s|win,g])+ Pr[lose|θ]v(Pr[s|lose,g]), and the payoﬀ from not gambling is v(Pr[s|b]). For the
candidate equilibrium to exist, it must be that for a b type the net ﬁnancial reward from taking a chance
and gambling at price z is less than the net skill estimate beneﬁt from playing it safe and not gambling,
and that the opposite is true for a g type. Assuming that an indiﬀerent decision maker always gambles,
the condition for type b is
E[x|b] − z<v (Pr[s|b]) − E[v(Pr[s|x,g])|b]( 4 )
and for type g is
E[x|g] − z ≥ v(Pr[s|b]) − E[v(Pr[s|x,g])|g]. (5)
Since E[x|θ]a n dP r [ win|θ] are increasing in θ and Pr[s|win,g] > Pr[s|lose,g], for v0 > 0az always exists
satisfying these conditions.
In the separating equilibrium a good type “shows oﬀ” her favorable information by gambling, but when
evaluation skill is suﬃciently important relative to performance skill and when the ﬁnancial costs to losing
12Divinity (Banks and Sobel, 1987) implies the weaker restriction that the observer puts more weight on the decision maker
having good (bad) news in the former (latter) case, while the intuitive criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987) need not restrict
beliefs at all in our context. As shown in an earlier version of this paper, we ﬁnd similar behavioral predictions under these
weaker restrictions on beliefs as under D1, though the lack of uniqueness complicates the presentation.
9are suﬃciently small, a “reverse separating” equilibrium is sometimes possible. In this case a decision
m a k e rw i t hab a dr a t h e rt h a ng o o ds i g n a li se x p e c t e dt og a m b l e ,s ot h a tl o s i n gr a t h e rt h a nw i n n i n gi sa
positive sign of having an accurate signal. Since this equilibrium seems comparatively unlikely and does
not share the properties of the other equilibria, to simplify the presentation we rule it out by assuming
that the ﬁnancial costs of such behavior outweigh any reputational gains from appearing skilled,13
E[x|b]+E[v(Pr[s|x,b])|b] <E [x|g]+E[v(Pr[s|x,b])|g]( 6 )
or
lose − win < v(Pr[s|win,b]) − v(Pr[s|lose,b]). (7)
Since lose < win by assumption, and since losing is never a good sign for a pure performance skill gamble,
Pr[s|win,b] > Pr[s|lose,b], this assumption is only relevant if there is an evaluation skill component to the
gamble. We emphasize that this assumption is purely to streamline the analysis and that there might be
cases where the reverse separating equilibrium is of interest.
For pooling equilibria, the two possibilities are a both-gamble equilibrium and a neither-gamble equi-
librium. In the both-gamble equilibrium, the observer cannot condition on θ so expected quality from
accepting the gamble is just Pr[s|x]a sd e ﬁned in (1) and (2). If the gamble is unexpectedly refused then,
as we conﬁrm in the proof of Proposition 1, the D1 reﬁnement implies that the observer believes that the
decision maker has a b signal, so the expected quality is just Pr[s|b]. Therefore the condition for existence
of a both gamble-equilibrium is, for θ = b,g,
E[x|θ] − z ≥ v(Pr[s|b]) − E[v(Pr[s|x])|θ]( 8 )
which clearly holds for z small enough.14
Regarding the neither-gamble equilibrium, the expected quality from not gambling is just Pr[s]a n dt h e
expected quality from gambling depends on the observer’s beliefs about who would unexpectedly gamble.
As we conﬁrm in the proof of Proposition 1, the D1 reﬁnement implies in this case that the observer believes
that the decision maker has a g signal, so the expected quality is Pr[s|x,g]. Therefore the condition for a
neither-gamble equilibrium is, for θ = b,g,
E[x|θ] − z<v (Pr[s]) − E[v(Pr[s|x,g])|θ]( 9 )
which clearly holds for z big enough.
These conditions are summarized in the following proposition. The details of the proof regarding the
D1 reﬁnement are in the Appendix, as are all subsequent proofs.
Proposition 1 Suppose v0 > 0. The separating equilibrium exists iﬀ (4) and (5) hold, the both-gamble
equilibrium exists iﬀ (8) holds, and the neither gamble equilibrium exists iﬀ (9) holds.
13As shown in the proof of Proposition 1, this assumption also simpliﬁes the analysis of oﬀ-equilibrium-path beliefs in the
neither-gamble equilibrium.
14Note that z can be negative. For instance, if we interpret gambling as not buying insurance, then a very high price of
insurance corresponds to a very negative z in which case both types will gamble by not taking insurance.
10To gain insight into the properties of these diﬀerent equilibria, and to better understand when they
exist, it is helpful to think in terms of the risk premium for a gamble, i.e., the amount that the decision
maker would have to be given to make her indiﬀerent to taking the gamble. The risk premium is always
positive in gambles without a skill signaling component when utility is concave in wealth (Pratt, 1964),
but here we are assuming that utility is linear in wealth and concentrating on the eﬀects created by skill
signaling. Because of the linearity assumption, the risk premium in our model just equals the net loss
or gain from the skill estimate component of expected utility. That is, for the separating equilibrium,
the risk premium for type b, denoted by πb, is just the RHS of (4), and the risk premium for type g,
denoted by πg, is just the RHS of (5). Similarly the risk premia for the both-gamble and neither-gamble
equilibria are given by the RHS of (8) and (9) respectively. We will also refer to the average risk premium,
π = πb Pr[b]+πg Pr[g].
If the risk premium πθ is positive (negative) then there is an expected loss (gain) to the skill estimate
component of utility from taking the gamble, so the price of the gamble z that would make type θ indiﬀerent
is less (greater) than E[x|θ]. Therefore the sign of the risk premium gives a simple indication of whether
a “fair gamble” with price z = E[x|θ] will be accepted or rejected by type θ.I n t h i s s e n s e t h e r i s k
premia provide a summary measure of whether skill signaling leads to more or less risky behavior. They
also provide a basis for relating our results to non-expected utility models of probability weighting as we
discuss in Section 4.
In the example of the previous section the decision maker has no private information about her skill, so
the observer has no reason to infer anything about her skill from the choice to gamble or not. Refusing to
gamble therefore oﬀers a safe alternative without loss of reputation so the risk premium is always positive
for v00 < 0. But when we allow for the possibility of private information, refusal to gamble can be seen
as lack of conﬁdence in one’s own ability, as seen by the estimates Pr[s|b] in the conditions (4), (5), and
(8) for the separating and both-gamble equilibria, so the decision maker has an added incentive to gamble,
implying that the risk premia can be negative rather than positive. A similar situation arises in the neither-
gamble equilibrium where if the decision maker decides to gamble then the observer thinks more favorably
of her, as seen by the term Pr[s|x,g] in condition (9). In each case the decision maker faces a trade-oﬀ
between revealing a lack of conﬁdence in her own skill by not gambling, and looking better on average from
gambling but at the risk of being embarrassed.
The following proposition provides conditions under which this tradeoﬀ between admitting incompe-
tence and risking embarrassment can be signed, so that the risk premia are deﬁnitely positive or negative.
Part (i) considers the case where the gamble has some performance skill so that Pr[s|g] − Pr[s|b] > 0. If
the probability of winning is small enough then there is very little loss in estimated skill from losing, so
the decision maker is better oﬀ taking a fair gamble than admitting to having a bad signal. Similarly, if
this signal is very informative, Pr[s|g]−Pr[s|b] approaches 1, then the amount of bad information provided
by choosing to not gamble dominates any risk from gambling even when losing is very embarrassing, so
the decision maker is better oﬀ gambling. Part (ii) considers the opposite case where Pr[s|g] − Pr[s|b]i s
very small, e.g., Pr[s|g]=P r [ s|b] as in a pure evaluation skill gamble. In this case very little information
11is revealed by refusing to gamble, so for v00 < 0 the decision maker prefers to not gamble rather than risk
embarrassment.15,16 This is similar to the case in the introductory example.
Proposition 2 (i) Suppose v0 > 0. In any pure strategy equilibrium the risk premia πθ a r en e g a t i v e( a )
for ﬁxed Pr[s|g] − Pr[s|b] > 0 and suﬃciently low Pr[win|g] and Pr[win|b] or (b) for ﬁxed Pr[win|g] and
Pr[win|b] and suﬃciently high Pr[s|g] − Pr[s|b].( i i )S u p p o s ev00 < 0. In any pure strategy equilibrium the
average risk premium π is positive for ﬁxed Pr[win|g] and Pr[win|b] and suﬃciently low Pr[s|g] − Pr[s|b].
Since the risk premia can be negative with private information about skill, the model captures the idea
that people can be dared into taking a gamble. For instance, teenagers often “overconﬁdently” take risky
actions to prove that they are not afraid. Even if they are not skilled at the risky activity they may prefer
to give in to peer pressure and take a chance rather than conﬁrm their inadequacy through refusing the
dare.17 The potential role for dare-taking and related behavior is enhanced by the existence of multiple
equilibria. For instance, comparing conditions (8) and (9), the both-gamble and neither-gamble equilibrium
can coexist depending on the parameter values, and comparing conditions (5) and (9), the separating and
neither-gamble equilibria always coexist for some z. The risk premia in each equilibrium are diﬀerent so
the incentive to gamble or not depends in part on what equilibrium is expected. For instance, not gambling
is not penalized in the neither-gamble equilibrium while it is in the separating and both-gamble equilibria,
so the risk premium (positive or negative) necessary to induce gambling is higher in the neither-gamble
equilibrium.
The existence of multiple equilibria also implies that the “framing” of the gamble can potentially make
ad i ﬀerence in determining whether a decision maker gambles or not. In particular, if the framing leads
the decision maker to expect the observer to have a negative impression of those who do not gamble, then
the decision maker is more likely to gamble, e.g., the both-gamble or separating equilibrium is more likely
than the neither-gamble equilibrium. Prospect theory ﬁnds that the “reference point” of a gamble can
aﬀect behavior, in that gambles are more likely when the ﬁxed alternative to gambling is framed as being
below the reference point. In a skill signaling model, manipulating the reference point can be seen as
providing information to the decision maker about how gambling or not gambling will be perceived, and a
high reference point could indicate that failure to gamble will be interpreted negatively by the observer.
The ﬁnding from Proposition 2(i) that suﬃciently low probability gambles have a negative risk premium
is consistent with the tendency to favor low probability gambles that is found in the prospect theory and
related literatures. A related result was found in the example of the previous section where it was shown
that a decision maker prefers a fair gamble with a 20% chance of winning to a fair gamble with an 80%
15Cowen and Glazer (2006) consider many labor market applications where decision makers are likely to be risk averse with
respect to estimates of their ability and therefore prefer to keep observers ignorant of their exact ability.
16In some contexts v might be convex, e.g., when a higher performance evaluation will ensure a promotion but a lower
evaluation will not lead to a demotion. Similar issues arise regarding reversal of the standard assumption of risk aversion
with respect to wealth, e.g., when higher wealth allows purchase of a large indivisible good.
17In richer information environments, e.g., when the observer also has private information about the decision maker’s skill,
trying too hard to prove one’s skill can itself signal a lack of conﬁdence (Feltovich, Harbaugh, and To, 2002).
12chance of winning. To investigate this issue of favoring low probability gambles more generally, we now
compare risk premia for pairs of gambles where, as in the example, the probability of winning at one gamble
is equal to the probability of losing at the other gamble. The current environment is more complicated
in that we must hold constant any diﬀerences in private information by the decision maker about her
skill and/or the gamble. As stated formally in the following deﬁnition, we refer to a pair of gambles as
symmetric if the probability of winning at one gamble equals the probability of losing at the other, if the
skill gap is the same, and if the probability of being skilled given the decision maker’s signal is the same.
To simplify the comparison we also assume that the probabilities of a good and bad signal are the same.
Deﬁnition 1 Two gambles F and G are a symmetric pair if PrF[win]=P r G[lose], PrF[win|s,θ] −
PrF[win|u,θ]=P r G[win|s,θ] − PrG[win|u,θ], PrF[q|θ]=P r G[q|θ],a n dPrF[θ]=P r G[θ]=1 /2 for
q ∈ {u,s}, θ ∈ {b,g}.
Using this deﬁnition, we now show that embarrassment aversion implies lower risk premia on low
probability gambles than on high probability gambles in each of the three pure strategy equilibria.
Proposition 3 Suppose v0 > 0, v00 < 0,a n dv000 > 0 and consider a symmetric pair of gambles F and G
where PrF[win]=P r G[lose] < 1/2. In any given pure strategy equilibrium the risk premia πθ are lower for
the F gamble than for the G gamble.
These results are for given equilibria, but the same equilibrium might not prevail for high and low
probability gambles. The following proposition shows that the tendency to favor lower probability gambles
r e m a i n se v e nw h e nd i ﬀerent equilibria are considered in that there is a stronger tendency for equilibria
with gambling to exist for low than high probability gambles. In particular, if an equilibrium exists in
which some type does not gamble for a low probability gamble, then an equilibrium with as little or less
gambling exists for a high probability gamble. And if an equilibrium exists in which some types gamble for
a high probability gamble, then an equilibrium exists with as much or more gambling for a low probability
gamble. These results assume that the net expected monetary values of the two gambles are the same,
e.g., a gamble with a 20% chance of winning $100 is priced at $20 and a gamble with an 80% chance of
winning $100 is priced at $80.
Proposition 4 Suppose v0 > 0, v00 < 0,a n dv000 > 0 and consider a symmetric pair of gambles F and G
with respective prices zF and zG where EF[x|θ]−zF = EG[x|θ]−zG and PrF[win]=P r G[lose] < 1/2.( i )
If a neither-gamble equilibrium exists for F then it exists for G.(ii) If a separating equilibrium exists for F
then it or a neither-gamble equilibrium exists for G. (iii) If a separating equilibrium exists for G then it or
a both-gamble equilibrium exists for F. (iv) If a both-gamble equilibrium exists for G then it exists for F.
This proposition shows the robustness of the results to diﬀerent equilibria, and also provides the straight-
forward prediction that, for ﬁxed expected monetary payoﬀs, low probability gambles are more frequently
taken than high probability gambles. Since measuring exact risk premia requires measuring willingness
13to pay, and since the decision maker has an incentive to strategically manipulate such information, this
substantially simpliﬁes testing the model.18
3.1 Extension: Outcome observed even if gamble refused
So far we have assumed that if the gamble is refused the observer does not learn the outcome of the gamble.
But in some cases the outcome is known regardless of whether the gamble is taken or not, e.g., a stock
price rises or falls regardless of whether a particular decision maker chooses to buy the stock. In such
cases the decision maker will be evaluated based on the outcome whether she takes the gamble or not, e.g.,
purchasing a stock that does poorly indicates poor skill at evaluating stocks, but so does not purchasing a
stock that does well. Since no information is revealed about skill if a gamble that only involves performance
skill is refused, we are interested in gambles with an evaluation skill component. For simplicity we restrict
attention to the case of pure evaluation skill.
If a decision maker is expected to gamble if and only if she has good news about the probability of
success, i.e., there is a separating equilibrium, then the decision maker looks wise for refusing a gamble
that loses and looks foolish for refusing a gamble that wins. Therefore the updating process works in the
opposite direction as with accepted gambles. This is most clear when a gamble is symmetric.
Deﬁnition 2 Ag a m b l eF with pure evaluation skill is symmetric if Pr[win|s,g]−Pr[win|u,g]=P r [ win|u,b]
−Pr[win|s,b] and Pr[g]=P r [ b]=1 /2.
Consider a symmetric gamble with pure evaluation skill where a separating equilibrium is being played
and the gamble is refused. The observer expects the decision maker has a bad signal θ = b, so the expected
skill conditional on x is, for x 6= x0,








Looking at the ﬁr s tl i n eo f( 1 0 ) ,s i n c et h eg a m b l ei sm o r el i k e l y to lose if a decision maker with a bad signal
is skilled rather than unskilled, Pr[win|s,b] < Pr[win|u,b], refusing a gamble that wins is embarrassing,
Pr[s|win,b] < Pr[s]. Now consider the second line of (10). For Pr[win]=1 /2, symmetry implies that
Pr[x|b]=P r [ x0|g], so Pr[s|x,b]=P r [ s|x0,g], i.e., the negative (positive) updating from refusing a gamble
that wins (loses) is the same as that from taking a gamble that loses (wins), and the risk premium is zero.
However for Pr[win] < 1/2, symmetry implies that Pr[win|b] < Pr[lose|g], so Pr[s|win,b] < Pr[s|lose,g],
i.e., it is more embarrassing to refuse a gamble that wins than to take a gamble that loses. And for
Pr[win] > 1/2, the reverse pattern holds, Pr[s|win,b] > Pr[s|lose,g]. Therefore, as shown in the ﬁrst part
of the following proposition, gambles with a low probability of success have negative risk premia even as
18In our model the decision maker has the usual incentive to underestimate willingness to pay so as to avoid paying too
much, and can also have an incentive to overestimate willingness to pay so as to signal private information about her skill
when θ is correlated with q.
14gambles with a high probability of success have more standard positive risk premia. For low probability
gambles losing is expected so the negative updating is limited if the gamble is taken and it loses. But for
the same reason if the gamble is refused and it wins, the observer will infer that the decision maker had
low quality information so the negative updating of skill is more substantial. The decision maker therefore
has a reputational incentive to accept a low probability gamble.
In the separating equilibrium the decision maker is judged whether she takes the gamble or not. But
for pooling equilibria where both types take the same action, the decision maker avoids judgement as long
as she does not deviate from the equilibrium. For instance, if both types are expected to take the gamble,
then the success or failure of the gamble provides no information on the quality of the decision maker’s
information and hence on her skill. If the decision maker deviates and refuses to take the gamble then the
observer will, following our D1 reﬁnement, infer that the decision maker has an unfavorable θ = b signal,
so the outcome is informative of the quality of this signal. Consequently, unless the ﬁnancial incentives are
suﬃciently strong, an embarrassment averse decision maker prefers to stick with the pooling equilibrium.
In particular, we ﬁnd that the average risk premium is always negative. If we consider the neither-gamble
equilibrium then again it is safer for the decision maker to pool rather than risk standing out and losing,
so in this case the risk premium is always positive.
Proposition 5 Consider a pure evaluation skill gamble where the outcome is observed even if the gamble is
refused. (i) Suppose v0 > 0, v00 < 0,a n dv000 > 0 and the gamble is symmetric. In the separating equilibrium
t h ea v e r a g er i s kp r e m i u mπ is negative (positive) for Pr[win] < (>)1/2. (ii) Suppose v0 > 0 and v00 < 0.
In the both-gamble (neither-gamble) equilibrium the risk premia πθ are always negative (positive).
Note that part (ii) implies that for a fair gamble, E[x]=z, the both-gamble and neither-gamble
equilibria will often coexist since each type of decision maker ﬁnds it least risky to take the same action as
the other type.19 The strong sensitivity of behavior in this environment to observer expectations can be
interpreted as implying a greater role for social inﬂuences such as “peer pressure”.
3.2 Extension: Observer uninformed of probability of success
So far we have assumed that the observer knows the unconditional probability of success, Pr[win], but
clearly this is not always true, e.g., a manager might know the diﬃculty of a project, but the manager’s
boss might be in the dark. When the observer is uninformed of the odds of the gamble we would naturally
expect the decision maker to favor high rather than low probability gambles, the opposite of what we have
found so far. Understanding this case helps clarify our main results and also provides a clear prediction that
can separate skill signaling from behavioral models where the decision maker always favors low probability
gambles.
To model this case assume there are two gambles F and G where PrF[win] < PrG[win]a n dw h e r e
the decision maker faces one of the two gambles, each with positive probability, but the observer does not
19Since E[x|g] ≥ E[x|b], we cannot be sure that both equilibria coexist based on the risk premia results unless the bet is
suﬃciently small.
15know which. If, as we have assumed so far, the decision maker has a private signal θ for each gamble
that is informative of the probability of success, then the decision maker has two dimensions of private
information so there are a large number of possible separating and partially separating equilibria. Therefore,
for simplicity, we revert to the model in the introduction and assume that the decision maker does not
have any private information other than knowing which gamble is being faced.
With this assumption, we refer to the separating equilibrium as the equilibrium where the G gamble is
taken and the F gamble is refused and the both-gamble (neither-gamble) equilibrium as the equilibrium
where either (neither) gamble is taken.
Proposition 6 Suppose v0 > 0 and the decision maker faces one of two gambles F or G where PrF[win]
< PrG[win] and there is no private information θ for either gamble. If the decision maker knows which
gamble she faces but the observer only knows that each gamble is faced with positive probability, then in
any pure strategy equilibrium the risk premium is higher for the F gamble than for the G gamble.
This result follows from just reinterpreting our base model with one gamble with private information
θ ∈ {b,g} as a model with two gambles where θ = b corresponds to gamble F and θ = g corresponds to
gamble G. In our base model the risk premium is always higher for type θ = b, so this implies that the risk
premium is higher for gamble F. The fact that our base model can be reinterpreted in this way highlights
the importance of being careful in tests of skill signaling. If, for instance, Pr[win|g]=3 /8, Pr[win|b]=1 /8,
and Pr[win]=1 /4, we predict that the risk premium is higher for type b facing Pr[win|b]=1 /8t h a nf o r
type g facing Pr[win|g]=3 /8. But we also predict that the risk premium is lower for each type than
in the paired symmetric gamble where Pr[win|b]=5 /8, Pr[win|g]=7 /8, and Pr[win]=3 /4. Our main
argument in this paper that lower probability gambles are favored refers to this latter conclusion.
In addition to these two extensions on observability of refused gambles and observability of the proba-
bility of success, clearly a number of other extensions are possible, many of which appear in related contexts
in the career concerns literature and may also be related to behavioral anomalies. For instance, the decision
maker might be able to choose whether to report that a gamble was taken, e.g., people often choose whether
to inform friends and associates of gambling or stock market outcomes. In such cases the absence of a
report may be interpreted as a sign of failure, thereby giving an extra incentive to take risky actions. The
presence of multiple gambles also changes the information structure substantially.20 Rather than pursuing
more of these extensions we now consider how our results relate to the literature on behavioral anomalies
in risk-taking.
20Multiple gambles are important in the fallacy of large numbers (Samuelson, 1963), the house-money eﬀect (Thaler and
Johnson, 1990), and the disposition eﬀect (Shefrin and Statman, 1995).
164 Relation to prospect theory and other models
4.1 Prospect Theory
As discussed in the introduction, these results are closely related to the key phenomena of loss aversion,
probability weighting, and framing eﬀects that have been identiﬁed in the prospect theory literature. Since
the connections with loss aversion and framing eﬀects are straightforward, we will concentrate on clarifying
the connection between skill signaling and probability weighting. We are interested in determining what
probably weighting function will be estimated from data on risk taking if the decision maker is concerned
in part with looking skilled, but is modeled as only concerned about the monetary payoﬀs.
Our results on risk premia can be related to the probability weighting function by ﬁnding the diﬀerent
certainty equivalents c for diﬀerent values of p =P r [ win] in a gamble and then inferring what weighted
probability w of winning would have induced a risk neutral decision maker unconcerned with embarrassment
aversion (or other factors) to choose that certainty equivalent.21 Setting w such that c = w(win)+( 1−





In our model with embarrassment aversion but without probability weighting (i.e., w = p) the certainty
equivalent is just c = p(win)+( 1− p)(lose) − π. So if the probability weighting function is estimated
as U = Y assuming no embarrassment aversion, but the true utility function is U = Y + v(Pr[s|Ω]) with
embarrassment aversion but without probability weighting, then the probability weights are estimated as




Note that overweighting is found if the risk premium is negative and underweighting is found if it is
positive. Moreover, the amount of overweighting or underweighting is in direct proportion to the risk
premium, so Proposition 3 implies that there will be disproportionate weight on low probabilities relative
to high probabilities, which is consistent with prospect theory.22
To see this in more detail, consider the example from Section 2 where v = −1/x and set lose =0a n d
win = 10 so that the imputed probability weighting function is
w(p)=p −
v(1/2) − (pv(Pr[s|win]) + (1 − p)v(Pr[s|lose))
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. (13)
As shown in Figure 2(a), the decision maker appears to underweight both high and low probability gam-
bles, and to underweight high probability gambles more strongly. Note that there is a “certainty eﬀect”
21Rather than assuming risk neutrality when estimating the probability weighting function, the prospect theory literature
sometimes follows the more complicated approach of disentangling the predictions of the probability weighting function and
the convex-concave utility function assumed in original prospect theory (Wu and Gonzalez, 1996).
22Recall from the discussion in the introduction that prospect theory treats gambles in gains and losses diﬀerently, and
the pattern of weighting across the two-domains leads to the “four-fold pattern”. Our model generates this same pattern by
considering only the probability of success, i.e., we do not care about the signs of win or lose but only require that win > lose.
17(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) or discontinuity at p = 1 in that the decision maker is especially wary of
gambles that are near sure things, but such fears disappear at the limit of p =1 . 23 S u c ha ne ﬀect arises
because the skill estimate Pr[s|lose] approaches 0 as Pr[win] goes to 1, so the decision maker becomes
increasingly worried about this small chance of extreme embarrassment. If we change the assumption in
the example so that the skill gap is half as large, Pr[win|s] − Pr[win|u]=P r [ win]Pr[lose], then losing
is not so embarrassing for large Pr[win] and this discontinuity disappears.24 Figure 2(b) shows this case
w h e r ew eh a v ea l s or e d u c e dt h eﬁnancial stakes, setting lose =0a n dwin = 1. As seen from (12) and
(13), lower stakes tend to accentuate the degree of underweighting, which in this case compensates for the
smaller skill gap.
Figure 2(c) shows the similar case as Figure 2(a), with the diﬀerence that we now allow the deci-
sion maker to have some private information regarding her skill, Pr[s|g]=.55 and Pr[s|b]=.45 where
Pr[win|s,θ] − Pr[win|u,θ]=2P r [ win]Pr[lose], Pr[s]=P r [ u] as before, and Pr[g]=P r [ b]. Now, instead of
there just being more relative weight on a low probability gamble than on its symmetric high probability
gamble, the gain from showing oﬀ conﬁdence in one’s skill implies there is overweighting of low probability
gambles. Pictured is the imputed weighting function for the separating equilibrium based on the average
risk premium.25 The weights for the both-gamble and neither-gamble equilibrium have the same pattern
but are lower since the choice to gamble or not is less revealing of the decision maker’s private information.
Note that the general pattern of this function with its discontinuity at p =0a n dp = 1 tracks that found
in Kahneman and Tversky (1979).
An example of pure evaluation skill where the outcome is observed even if the gamble is refused
is shown in Figure 2(d). Similar to the case of Figure 2(b), we assume a more moderate skill gap,
Pr[win|s,g] − Pr[win|u,g]=P r [ win|u,b] − Pr[win|s,b]=P r [ win]Pr[lose], set lose =0a n dwin =1 ,
and make the symmetry assumption that Pr[g]=P r [ b]. The ﬁgure shows the imputed weighting function
for the separating equilibrium where, as implied by Proposition 4, there is overweighting for Pr[win] < 1/2
and underweighting for Pr[win] > 1/2. This pattern is similar to that in Tversky and Kahneman (1992),
with the exception that they ﬁnd underweighting starting at a point below p =1 /2. Recall that behavior
in this version of the model is particularly susceptible to multiple equilibria since both types want to pool
with each other when monetary incentives are weak. In the both-gamble equilibrium the risk premium is
always negative while in the neither-gamble equilibrium it is always positive, implying that there is always
overweighting in the former equilibrium and always underweighting in the latter equilibrium.
We have chosen the parameters in these examples for their simplicity and their ability to generate
probability weighting functions that track the canonical forms in Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and
Tversky and Kahneman (1986). However, other parameters can generate functions that diﬀer signiﬁcantly
23The certainty eﬀect can also arise from a simple fear of being cheated, in that it is much easier to demand payment of
an amount promised with 100% certainty than an amount promised with 99% certainty. Our model partially captures this
concern in that determining when a winning gamble will really be paid can be interpreted as evaluation skill, so that failure
to be paid is an embarrassing indication of poor judgement.
24In this case Pr[s|lose] approaches 1/4 rather than 0 as Pr[win]g o e st o1 .
25Since the risk premia are diﬀerent for types b and g, the imputed weighting functions are also diﬀerent.
18Figure 2: Imputed probability weighting functions if skill signaling is omitted, p =P r [ win]
from these, and the prospect theory literature itself has found considerable variety. From a skill signaling
perspective, the restrictions on the shape of these functions are (for the base model) those implied by the
risk premia results of Propositions 2 and 3 — that suﬃciently low probability gambles are overweighted
in absolute terms if the decision maker has private information about her skill, and that low probability
gambles are overweighted in relative terms quite generally. Note from (13) that the probability weights
need not be positive when the risk of embarrassment is signiﬁcant and the monetary incentives are small,
e.g., in some cases a decision maker might prefer to avoid a zero-cost gamble even if all the outcomes are
non-negative.26
Behavior consistent with prospect theory is often found in managerial decision-making and other envi-
ronments where skill signaling is likely to be important. Our results indicate that it is an open question
26Negative probability weights are found by Gneezy, List, and Gonzalez (2006), who label the phenomenon the “uncertainty
eﬀect”. We discuss negative weights further in our comparison of skill signaling and rank-dependent utility.
19whether behavioral or strategic models best capture such behavior. The results also raise the question of
whether the prospect theory behavior observed in experimental settings might have a skill signaling compo-
nent. Unlike the early social psychology experiments, most prospect theory experiments do not explicitly
involve skill, so the role of skill signaling would appear to be limited.27 However, the behavior observed in
experiments might reﬂect rule-of-thumb strategies based on skill signaling that are not appropriate for pure
games of chance, but that are generally advisable given that most real world gambles involve both skill and
chance.28 Consistent with this view, people often behave as if there is a skill component to pure chance
outcomes (Langer, 1975), so they may still feel embarrassment or loss of self-image at losing. Another
possibility is that experimental tests of prospect theory have not fully controlled for skill. In particular,
most tests starting with Kahneman and Tversky (1979) involve hypothetical gambles so it is not clear
whether subjects in these experiments should imagine that losing would reﬂect unfavorably on them. Con-
sistent with this perspective, recent experiments using real gambles without a skill component29 ﬁnd that
probability weighting weakens or disappears (Laury and Holt, 2002; Harbaugh, Krause, and Vesterlund,
2002a; Harbaugh, Krause, and Vesterlund, 2002b; Bosch-Domenech and Silvestre, 2003).30
4.2 Other models
We have emphasized the relation between skill signaling and prospect theory because of the close connec-
tions that we ﬁnd and because both models are so widely used in economics and related disciplines. We
now consider several other models in less detail.
Achievement motivation Skill signaling can be seen as a formalization of key aspects of Atkinson’s
(1957) model of achievement motivation, one of the primary psychological models of risk taking before
prospect theory.31 Atkinson notes that diﬀerent probability gambles convey diﬀerent information about
skill, and argues that people will be most afraid of gambles with an equal probability of success or failure
27The phenomena of loss aversion and framing can also arise in contexts without explicit uncertainty, in which case the role
of skill is likely to be small.
28Such arguments are often used to explain anomalous behavior when the experimental design is close to familiar real
world environments, but predicted behavior diﬀers from what would be appropriate in such environments, e.g., Halevy and
Feltkamp (2005) make such an argument regarding uncertainty aversion.
29Of course, completely eliminating skill from an experiment is diﬃcult since a subject’s decision to participate involves
an evaluation that the likely payoﬀ will be higher than the opportunity cost of time. Even conditional on participation,
evaluation skill arises regarding subject estimates that the odds really are as reported and that they really will get paid if
they win. Performance skill also arises if some subjects are more likely to understand the instructions than other subjects.
Given these uncertainties, subjects with large earnings have favorable information about their judgment to report to friends
and family, and subjects with low earnings have good reason to feel foolish.
30Harbaugh, Krause, and Vesterlund (2002a) ﬁnd that adults weight gambles linear l yb u tc h i l d r e nt e n dt ou n d e r w e i g h t
low probability gambles and overweight high probability gambles. Reverse probability weighting by children could reﬂect
insuﬃcient understanding that success is less impressive when the gamble is easy. Relatedly, as shown in Section 3.2, reverse
probability weighting arises when the odds of the gamble are treated as private information.
31I thank Tatiana Kornienko for noting the connection between the model in this paper and the early social psychology
models. See Coombs, Dawes, and Tversky (1970) for a discussion of the early psychological models of risk taking.
20since they are most revealing of ability. Experiments found evidence of this behavior, but also found a
strong tendency to favor long-shots relative to sure things, behavior that was considered to be outside of the
model’s predictions (Atkinson, Bastian, Earl, and Litwin, 1960; Atkinson and Litwin, 1960).32 Applying
our results on skill signaling to Atkinson’s model, this inability to explain probability weighting is due to
use of a simple piece-wise linear function to represent a decision maker’s utility from what eﬀectively are
diﬀerent skill estimates.
In particular, Atkinson assumes that the utility gain from winning a gamble and the utility loss from
losing a gamble are both linear functions of the probability of success. Letting the constants ms > 0a n d
mf > 0 represent the respective motives to gain success and avoid failure, the decision maker’s utility from
a gamble with a p chance of success is assumed to be pms(1−p)+(1−p)mf(−p)w h e r e1−p is the utility
from success and −p is the utility from failure. Rearranging, the utility from the gamble is (ms − mf)
p(1 − p)w h i c hf o rms >m f is maximized at p =1 /2, and for ms <m f is maximized for p as close as
possible to 0 or 1. Therefore, those with a stronger motive to achieve should prefer gambles with a near
equal probability of success, and those with a stronger motive to avoid failure should prefer more extreme
gambles.
Atkinson’s utility function maps directly into our model when estimated skill from winning and losing
is linear in the probability of success,33 when the decision maker does not have any private information
about her own skill or about the gamble, and when v is a piecewise linear function with a kink at 1/2.
If ms >m f then this corresponds to the case where v is convex, and if ms <m f then this corresponds
to our case where v is concave and decision makers are risk averse with respect to their reputations. The
key diﬀerence with our model is that we assume that v000 > 0s ot h a tt h es l o p eo fv is increasingly steep
for lower skill estimates as seen in Figure 1(b). Such downside risk aversion implies that decision makers
want to avoid gambles where success is expected and tend to favor long shots. Incorporating a standard
utility function with downside risk aversion into Atkinson’s original model allows it to explain the observed
pattern of favoring long-shots relative to near sure things, and thereby realize Atkinson’s insight that there
is “little embarrassment in failing” at diﬃcult tasks and a great “sense of humiliation” in failing at easy
tasks.
Self-esteem Following the career concerns literature, we have presented the model primarily in terms
of the decision maker having a concern for the esteem of others, but if the decision maker feels utility in
maintaining self-esteem, the observer in our model can be seen as the decision maker herself. The idea
that self-esteem is aﬀected by the outcome of risky decisions, and that people may avoid risk to avoid
loss of self-esteem, dates back at least to James (1890), who deﬁned self-esteem as the ratio of success
to “pretensions”, and noted that self-esteem could be raised “as well by diminishing the denominator as
increasing the numerator.” Of course, avoiding a situation where success is not assured can also reveal
32The experiments used shuﬄe board and ring-toss games in which the subjects could choose from what distance to play.
The theoretical model predicted that subjects who were afraid of failure would prefer long or close distances to intermediate
distances. Most choices were for long distances with a low probability of success.
33This holds under our assumptions when, as in Figure 1(a), the skill gap is proportional to Pr[win]Pr[lose].
21unfavorable information to one’s self and others.34 Our analysis formalizes the tradeoﬀ between the sure
loss in esteem from such avoidance and the uncertain loss from taking a chance and losing, and shows how
this tradeoﬀ changes with the probability of success.
The empirical literature supports the idea that self-esteem matters (Diener and Diener, 1995) and that
many people are risk averse with respect to self-esteem (Falk, Huﬀman, and Sunde, 2006). A concern for
self-esteem could reﬂect a direct preference (Koszegi, 2006), or as Benabou and Tirole (2002) note, it could
be instrumental in that high self-esteem makes it less costly to convey a favorable image to others, in which
case our arguments about skill signaling apply directly.35 However, in some cases the relation between self-
esteem and skill signaling can be more complicated. Benabou and Tirole (2002) consider self-esteem in a
model where a decision maker’s self-knowledge about ability aﬀects her incentive to take costly actions, and
ﬁnd conditions under which higher conﬁdence is a motivating factor that leads to higher eﬀort. They also
ﬁnd conditions under which a decision maker will want to motivate herself, so that self-esteem is desirable,
and conditions under which a lack of conﬁdence is particularly damaging, which can be interpreted as risk
aversion with respect to self-esteem.36 Higher self-esteem is not always desirable in their model, however,
since it can sometimes lead to slacking oﬀ.
Self-handicapping T h eq u e s t i o no fh o wd i ﬀerent probabilities of success reveal diﬀerent information
about ability is central to the theory of self-handicapping in which people deliberately lower the odds of
success so as to reduce the loss in self-esteem or public image due to failure (Jones and Berglas, 1978).37
Our model formalizes the implicit assumption in this literature that losing at lower probability gambles
is less damaging to estimated ability. Not addressed in this literature is that self-handicapping makes
losing more frequent even as it makes losing less painful, so it is unclear why people should prefer to
self-handicap. We explicitly address this tradeoﬀ and show that downside risk aversion and/or private
information about skill can explain a preference for gambles with a lower probability of success. Benabou
and Tirole (2002) also address self-handicapping as a strategy to maintain conﬁdence, and model it as
taking an ineﬃcient action that completely avoids revealing ability. Our results indicate why actions that
reduce the probability of success, but still allow for some chance of revealing high ability, are an attractive
self-handicapping strategy.
Rank-dependent utility When individual probabilities are weighted diﬀerently from their actual (or
subjective) probabilities, a decision maker will sometimes choose a stochastically dominated gamble (Fish-
burn, 1978). To avoid this problem, Quiggin (1982) develops an alternative weighting model that reweights
34Self-signaling in this context requires some form of intrapersonal asymmetric information (Benabou and Tirole, 2002 and
2004; Bodner and Prelec, 2003).
35They note that there may be a purely hedonic value from thinking highly of oneself.
36Note that risk-aversion with respect to self-esteem implies that the decision maker prefers to have less self-knowledge of
her abilities, but more accurate self-knowledge can be desirable in that it improves decision-making (Rauh, 2006). In such
cases the decision maker is essentially risk-loving rather than risk-averse with respect to self-esteem.
37The literature considers both esteem and self-esteem as factors and ﬁnds that self-handicapping is more common in public
situations (Kolditz and Arkin, 1982).
22the entire probability distribution rather than individual probabilities. This rank-dependent utility ap-
proach is adopted by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) in their model of cumulative prospect theory. Mon-
etary outcomes are not the only contributors to utility in our model, so a decision maker might in fact
prefer a gamble that is stochastically dominated in the monetary dimension. That is, from a skill signaling
perspective, there is no reason to assume that a weighting function based on rank-dependent utility is a
better predictor of behavior than the weighting function used in original prospect theory.
This paper considers the simple case of choosing between a gamble with two outcomes and a ﬁxed
amount, in which case both forms of probability weighting are typically equivalent. But even in this case,
stochastic dominance in the monetary dimension can be violated when the risk premia due to embarrass-
ment aversion are suﬃciently large or the monetary values suﬃciently small that the imputed probability
weights are negative. The decision maker then prefers to avoid a free gamble even when all outcomes are
positive, i.e., the decision maker prefers the stochastically dominated choice of not gambling. For instance,
if a gamble if both outcomes of a free gamble are positive but close to zero, a decision maker might prefer
to avoid the bet if she thinks it is too risky in terms of revealing a lack of skill. Likewise, if a manager is
considering a project where the direct ﬁnancial beneﬁts to the manager stochastically dominate the direct
ﬁnancial costs, the manager might still avoid the project if the danger of embarrassment is suﬃciently high.
Regret theory Skill signaling is also related to models of regret theory in which the utility function
includes wealth and an additively separable regret function that is increasing in the diﬀerence between the
realized and unrealized outcomes (Bell, 1982; Loomes and Sugden, 1982). For instance, a stock might be
bought because of the regret that would arise if it was not purchased and did well. This is related to our
result that the success of a refused gamble reﬂects unfavorably on the decision maker. Regret theory can
explain prospect theory’s weighting function if the regret function is less concave for negative outcomes than
for corresponding negative outcomes, a condition very similar to our assumption of decreasing concavity
with respect to skill estimates.
A distinguishing prediction of regret theory relative to prospect theory is that a decision maker will pay
to avoid learning the outcome of a refused gamble (Bell, 1983). Skill signaling implies the related prediction
that, for v00 < 0, the decision maker prefers to keep the observer rather than herself in the dark. However,
the predictions can be quite similar since skill signaling can also involve signaling to one’s self, and since
one factor in regret might be external incentives similar to career concerns. In fact, Bell (1982) suggests
that “the evaluation of others, one’s bosses for example, may be an important consideration” in regret
but regret theory does not formally model how such evaluations would be aﬀected by diﬀerent gambles.
By explicitly allowing for some decision makers to be more skilled than others, we are able to show why
losing high probability gambles is more embarrassing than losing low probability gambles and to analyze
the diﬀerent equilibria that can result.
Disappointment aversion To most simply capture the Allais paradox and related phenomena, Gul
(1991) develops a model of disappointment aversion in which decision makers receive extra utility from
23outcomes that are higher than the certainty equivalent of the gamble, and extra disutility from outcomes
that are worse than the certainty equivalent.38 This diﬀers from regret theory in which concern over
unrealized outcomes drives behavior. Our model only has two outcomes, and in equilibrium success of an
accepted gamble always leads to a higher skill estimate than failure, so the predictions of disappointment
aversion and skill signaling are quite similar over the domain we consider. In particular, Gul (1991)
ﬁnds that, for a two-outcome gamble, disappointment aversion implies a probability weighting function
equivalent to that in Quiggin (1982) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992).
5C o n c l u s i o n
Simple economic models are often poor predictors of behavior. The behavioral approach to this failing, as
exempliﬁed by prospect theory, is to include perceptual and cognitive biases that interfere with rational
decision making. In this paper our approach is to enrich the economic model by including strategic and
informational eﬀects that are often omitted. In recent decades this strategic approach has shown how a
wide range of seemingly irrational behaviors may in fact be quite reasonable, e.g., the signaling literature
shows how wasteful displays can be individually rational, the folk theorem and reputation literatures show
that cooperative behavior does not require altruism, the career concerns literature shows that people are
often right to care about sunk costs, and the information cascades literature shows how rational individuals
can ineﬃciently herd. This paper uses insights from the social psychology and career concerns literatures
to show that the key behavioral anomalies associated with prospect theory are also predicted by a model
of rational skill signaling in environments where decision makers care about appearing skilled. The results
indicate that prospect theory behavior observed in many economic, ﬁnancial, and managerial decisions
might be confounded with eﬀects due to skill signaling.
Given the similar predictions of prospect theory and skill signaling in such environments, it is not
always necessary to distinguish between the theories. For instance, if consumers and investors want to
avoid looking foolish in front of friends and family, one modeling choice is to assume loss aversion rather
than formally incorporate the information ﬂows. However, as seen from the range of behaviors analyzed in
the career concerns literature, the predictions of skill signaling are sensitive to the information and incentive
environments, so distinguishing between the theories is often important. In particular, this paper shows
that prospect theory’s prediction of loss aversion can be reversed when private information on skill allows
for dare-taking behavior. It also shows that prospect theory’s predicted pattern of probability weighting is
reversed when observers are uninformed of the probabilities. These diﬀerences indicate when it is important
to explicitly model the information ﬂows, and also provide a basis for testing the relative explanatory power
of the behavioral and strategic approaches to understanding risk.
38Related to disappointment aversion and to skill signaling is Neilson’s (2002) model of victory and defeat in which the
decision maker receives higher state-dependent utility from an outcome when the outcome is more favorable and rare relative
to the other outcomes, and lower state-dependent utility when it is less favorable and rare. Neilson shows how the Allais
paradox and a number of other risk anomalies can be explained by such a model.
246A p p e n d i x
We ﬁrst prove the following lemma which is used in the proofs of Propositions 3 and 5.
Lemma 1: Consider a distribution P(x)o nx ∈ {l,w} ⊂ [0,1], and a distribution Q(x)o nx ∈
{L,W} ⊂ [0,1]. If L<l<W<w , W − L ≥ w − l,P r P[w]=P r Q[L] < 1/2, and EP(x) ≥ EQ(x), then
EP[v(x)] ≥ EQ[v(x)] for all v such that v0 > 0, v00 < 0, and v000 > 0.
Proof: We apply Whitmore’s (1970) third-order stochastic dominance result that, for v0 > 0, v00 < 0,
v000 > 0, the distribution P(x)o n[ 0 ,1] is weakly preferred to the distribution Q(x)o n[ 0 ,1] if






(Q(x) − P(x))dxdb ≥ 0 (15)
for all a ∈ [0,1]. Condition (14) is a condition of the lemma. Regarding condition (15), note that
P(x)=0 f o rx<l
P(x)=P r P[l]f o r l ≤ x<w
P(x)=1 f o rx ≥ w
and
Q(x)=0 f o rx<L
Q(x)=P r Q[L]f o r L ≤ x<W
Q(x)=1 f o rx ≥ W
so Q(x)=P(x)=0f o rx<L , Q(x) >P(x)f o rL ≤ x<l , Q(x) <P(x)f o rl ≤ x<W, Q(x) >P(x)f o r
W ≤ x<w ,a n dQ(x)=P(x)=1f o rx ≥ w. Therefore if (15) holds for a = W then it must hold for all





























where I is the index function.39




[L](w − L) ≥ Pr
P
[l](W − l).
39Geometrically, the distribution functions are ﬂat on [L,W]a n d[ l,W] respectively, so the areas under them are increasing
linear functions with slopes Pr[L]a n dP r [ l] respectively, so the comparison is between a triangle with base W −L and height
Pr[L](W − L) and a triangle with base W − l and height Pr[l](W − l).
25Therefore, from (16), condition (15) holds if condition (14) holds and if
(W − L)
2 ≥ (w − L)(W − l)
⇐⇒ (W − L)
2 ≥ ((w − l)+( l − L))((W − L) − (l − L))
⇐=( W − L)
2 ≥ (W − L)
2 − (l − L)
2 (17)
where the ﬁnal implication holds by the condition of the lemma that W − L ≥ w − l. ¥
Proof of Proposition 1: Conditions (4) and (5) for the separating equilibrium are straightforward
since there are no oﬀ-equilibrium-path outcomes. Regarding the both-gamble equilibrium, D1 requires that
if one type is willing to deviate to not gambling for a larger range of observer actions, i.e., estimates of the
decision maker’s skill, the observer believes that any such deviation comes from that type. By assumption,
Pr[s|g] ≥ Pr[s|b] so any estimated skill y from not gambling is in the range Y =[ P r [ s|b],Pr[s|g]]. Given
such a y a decision maker prefers to gamble iﬀ
E[x|θ] − z ≥ v(y) − E[v(Pr[s|x])|θ]. (18)
Let Yθ ⊂ Y be the subset of Y such that (18) does not hold for type θ, i.e., the y ∈ Y such that type θ will
deviate. Since E[x|θ]a n dE[v(Pr[s|x])|θ] are both increasing in θ,f o rv0 > 0 there are three possibilities,
Yg ( Yb ⊂ Y , Yg = Yb = ∅,a n dYg = Yb = Y .I n t h e ﬁrst case D1 implies that y =P r [ s|b]a n dt h e
both-gamble equilibrium exists iﬀ condition (8) holds. In the second case D1 does not restrict beliefs,
neither type will deviate for any beliefs, and (8) holds. In the third case D1 does not restrict beliefs, either
type will deviate for any beliefs, and (8) does not hold. So an equilibrium surviving D1 holds iﬀ (8) holds.
Now consider the neither-gamble equilibrium. In this case the observer will combine his beliefs about
which type deviated with the outcome x of the gamble, and the probability of x depends on θ.E s t i m a t e d
skill y(x) is in the range Y (x) = [minθ Pr[s|x,θ], maxθ Pr[s|x,θ]].40 A decision maker prefers to gamble iﬀ
E[x|θ] − z ≥ v(Pr[s]) − E[v(y(x))|θ]. (19)
Let Y = Y (win) × Y (lose)a n dl e tYθ ⊂ Y be the subset of Y such that (19) does not hold. First
suppose y(win) ≥ y(lose). Then E[v(y(x))|θ]i si n c r e a s i n gi nθ since Pr[win|g] > Pr[win|b]. Since E[x|θ]
is also increasing in θ,t y p eg has more incentive to deviate. Now suppose y(lose) >y (win), in which
case E[v(y(x))|θ]i sd e c r e a s i n gi nθ. For any F, the largest gap E[v(y(x))|b] − E[v(y(x))|g]i sw h e n ,f o r
pure evaluation skill, Y (win)=P r [ s|win,b]a n dY (lose)=P r [ s|lose,b]. However, by assumption (6),
E[x|θ] − E[v(y(x))|θ]i sa l w a y si n c r e a s i n gi nθ even for this case, so type g always has more incentive to
deviate. Therefore we again have three cases Yb ( Yg ⊂ Y , Yb = Yg = ∅,a n dYb = Yg = Y ,a n db yt h e
equivalent arguments as for the both-gamble equilibrium, an equilibrium surviving D1 holds iﬀ (9) holds.
¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :(i-a) In the separating equilibrium, the risk premium for type θ is πθ =
v(Pr[s|b]) − Pr[win|θ]v(Pr[s|win,g])− Pr[lose|θ]v(Pr[s|lose,g]). Considering Pr[s|lose,g]f r o m( 3 ) ,a s
40Recall that Pr[s|x,θ]n e e dn o tb em o n o t o n i ci nθ for a gamble with evaluation skill. Also note that it is straightforward
to show that if the observer places positive probability on each type having gambled, payoﬀsa r es t i l li nY (x).
26Pr[win|g]g o e st o0a n dP r [ lose|g]g o e st o1 ,P r [ lose|s,g]a n dP r [ lose|u,g] must both go to 1 unless
the ratio Pr[s|g]/Pr[u|g] becomes arbitrarily large, which is not possible for ﬁxed Pr[s|g] − Pr[s|b], so
Pr[s|lose,g]g o e st oP r [ s|g]. Therefore πg goes to v(Pr[s|b]) − v(Pr[s|g]) as Pr[win|g] goes to zero, as
does πb since Pr[win|b] < Pr[win|g]. For v0 > 0a n dﬁxed Pr[s|g] > Pr[s|b], v(Pr[s|b]) <v (Pr[s|g]) so
πb,π g < 0f o rs u ﬃciently small Pr[win|g] > Pr[win|b]. In the both-gamble equilibrium, the risk pre-
mium for type θ is πθ = v(Pr[s|b])− Pr[win|b]v(Pr[s|win])− Pr[lose|b]v(Pr[s|lose]), which by the same
arguments goes to v(Pr[s|b]) − v(Pr[s]) < 0a sP r [ win|g] > Pr[win|b]g o e st oz e r o ,s oπb,π g < 0f o r
suﬃciently small Pr[win|g] > Pr[win|b]. In the neither-gamble equilibrium, the risk premium for type
θ is πθ = v(Pr[s])− Pr[win]v(Pr[s|win,g])− Pr[lose]v(Pr[s|lose,g]), which by the same arguments goes
to v(Pr[s]) − v(Pr[s|g]) < 0a sP r [ win|g] > Pr[win|b] goes to zero, so πb,π g < 0f o rs u ﬃciently small
Pr[win|g] > Pr[win|b].
(i-b) For ﬁxed Pr[win|θ], as Pr[s|g] − Pr[s|b]g o e st o1 ,P r [ s|x,g] goes to 1 from (3). Therefore, in the
separating equilibrium, as Pr[s|g]−Pr[s|b]g o e st o1 ,πθ goes to v(0)−v(1) < 0. Similarly, in the both-gamble
equilibrium, as Pr[s|g]−Pr[s|b]g o e st o1 ,πθ goes to v(0)− Pr[win]v(Pr[s|win])− Pr[lose]v(Pr[s|lose]) < 0.
And in the neither-gamble equilibrium, as Pr[s|g]g o e st o1 ,πθ goes to v(Pr[s]) − v(1) < 0.
(ii) For ﬁxed Pr[win|θ], as Pr[s|g]−Pr[s|b]g o e st o0 ,P r [ s|x,g]g o e st oP r [ s|x]. Therefore in any of the
equilibria, as Pr[s|g]−Pr[s|b]g o e st o0 ,πθ goes to v(Pr[s])− Pr[win|θ]v(Pr[s|win])− Pr[lose|θ]v(Pr[s|lose]),
and the average premium π goes to v(Pr[s])− Pr[win]v(Pr[s|win])− Pr[lose]v(Pr[s|lose]) < 0w h e r et h e
inequality follows from v00 < 0. ¥
Proof of Proposition 3: Starting with the separating equilibrium, from (4) and (5) the risk premium
for type θ for gamble F is πF,θ = v(PrF[s|b])− PrF[win|θ]v(PrF[s|win,g]) − PrF[lose|θ]v(PrF[s|lose,g])
and for gamble G is πG,θ = v(PrG[s|b])− PrG[win|θ]v(PrG[s|win,g]) − PrG[lose|θ]v(PrG[s|lose,g]). Since



















Applying Lemma 1, let l =P r F[s|lose,g], w =P r F[s|win,g], L =P r G[s|lose,g], and W =P r G[s|win,g],
and let, for type θ,P r P[l]=P r F[lose|θ], PrP[w]=P r F[win|θ], PrQ[L]=P r G[lose|θ], and PrQ[W]=
PrG[win|θ]. Noting that PrF[win|θ]=P r G[lose|θ] by the symmetry assumption, the condition PrP[w]=




































































where we have used the symmetry restriction PrG[win|s,g]−PrG[win|u,g]=P r F[win|s,g]− PrF[win|u,g] >



























































































PrG[lose|g](Pr G[win|s,g] − PrG[win|u,g])−




















Therefore, since PrG[q|g]=P r F[q|g]a n dP r F[win|s,θ] − PrF[win|u,θ]=P r G[win|s,θ] − PrG[win|u,θ]b y




































[win|g] − 1) ≥ 0 (29)
28where the ﬁnal inequality holds since PrG[win|g] > PrF[win|g]f o rP r G[win] > PrF[win]b yt h eP r F[g]=
PrG[g] symmetry assumption and since PrF[win|g] > PrF[win], PrG[win|g] > PrG[win], and PrF[win]+
PrG[win]=1 .
Regarding condition (23), note that it holds with equality for θ = g since PrF[g]=P r G[g]. Regarding









































































































































































































































w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h es y m m e t r yr e s t r i c t i o n st h a tP r F[g]=P r G[g]=1 /2a n dt h a tP r F[win|g] −
PrF[win|b]=P r G[win|g] − PrG[win|b] and where the ﬁnal inequality holds by (22). Therefore (23) holds
for θ = b as well and πF,θ <π G,θ.
Now considering the both-gamble equilibrium, from (8) πF,θ =P r F[s|b] − (PrF[win|θ]v(PrF[s|win]) +
PrF[lose|θ]v(PrF[s|lose])) and πG,θ =P r G[s|b]− (PrG[win|θ]v(PrG[s|win])+PrG[lose|θ]v(PrG[s|lose])), so



















If the gamble is pure evaluation skill then no information is revealed about type from the outcome,
PrF[s|x]=P r F[s]a n dP r G[s|x]=P r G[s]. Therefore since, PrF[s]=P r G[s]b ys y m m e t r y ,t h er e s u l t
29holds weakly, πF,θ = πG,θ. Now consider if there is some performance skill so PrF[win|s] − PrF[win|u]=
PrG[win|s] − PrG[win|u] > 0. Applying Lemma 1 in the same manner as above, and noting that





















































































These conditions all holds since PrG[win|s] > PrG[win|u].






















[win] − 1) = 0 (39)
which holds by symmetry.


















which holds with equality by (39). So again πF,θ <π G,θ.
Finally, considering the neither-gamble equilibrium, πF,θ <π G,θ holds under the same conditions as
(20), which all hold as shown above. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 :(i) Existence of a neither-gamble equilibrium for F implies πF,g >E F[x|g]−
zF and πF,b >E F[x|b] − zF.S i n c e πF,θ <π G,θ from Proposition 3 and EF[x|θ] − zF = EG[x|θ] − zG,
30this implies πG,g >E G[x|g] − zG and πG,b >E G[x|b] − zG, so a neither-gamble equilibrium exists for
G. (ii) Existence of a separating equilibrium for F implies that πF,b >E F[x|b] − zF.S i n c e πF,θ <π G,θ
from Proposition 3 and EF[x|θ] − zF = EG[x|θ] − zG, this implies πG,b >E G[x|b] − zG. Therefore, if
πG,g >E G[x|g] − zG a neither-gamble equilibrium exists for G, while if πG,g ≤ EG[x|g] − zG a separating
equilibrium exists for G. (iii) Existence of a separating equilibrium for G implies πG,g ≤ EG[x|g]−zG.S i n c e
πF,θ <π G,θ from Proposition 3 and EF[x|θ]−zF = EG[x|θ]−zG, this implies πF,g <E F[x|g]−zF. Therefore,
if πF,b >E F[x|b] − zF a separating equilibrium exists for F, while if πF,b ≤ EF[x|b] − zF a both-gamble
equilibrium exists for F. (iv) Existence of a both-gamble equilibrium for G implies πG,g ≤ EG[x|g] − zG
and πG,b ≤ EG[x|b] − zG.S i n c e πF,θ <π G,θ from Proposition 3 and EG[x|g] − zG = EF[x|g] − zF,t h i s
implies πF,g ≤ EF[x|g] − zF and πF,b ≤ EF[x|b] − zF, so a both-gamble equilibrium exists for F. ¥
Proof of Proposition 5: Since the outcome is observed even if the gamble is not taken, in the sepa-
rating equilibrium the risk premium for type θ is πθ =P r [ win|θ]v(Pr[s|win,b])+Pr[lose|θ]v(Pr[s|lose,b]) −
(Pr[win|θ]v(Pr[s|win,g]) + Pr[lose|θ]v(Pr[s|lose,g])), so the average risk premium π = πb Pr[b]+πg Pr[g]
is negative if
Pr[win]v(Pr[s|win,g]) + Pr[lose]v(Pr[s|lose,g])
> Pr[win]v(Pr[s|win,b]) + Pr[lose]v(Pr[s|lose,b]). (41)
First suppose Pr[win] < 1/2. Applying Lemma 1 in the same manner as in Proposition 3, let l =
Pr[s|lose,g], w =P r [ s|win,g], L =P r [ s|win,b], and W =P r [ s|lose,b], and let PrP[l]=P r Q[W]=P r [ lose]
and PrP[w]=P r Q[L]=P r [ win]. Note that PrP[w]=P r Q[L] < 1/2. Therefore (41) holds if
Pr[s|win,b] < Pr[s|lose,g] < Pr[s|lose,b] < Pr[s|win,g], (42)
Pr[s|lose,b] − Pr[s|win,b] ≥ Pr[s|win,g] − Pr[s|lose,g], (43)
and
Pr[win]Pr[s|win,g]+P r [ lose]Pr[s|lose,g]
≥ Pr[win]Pr[s|win,b]+P r [ lose]Pr[s|lose,b]. (44)


























⇐⇒ Pr[lose|g] > Pr[win|b] ⇐⇒ Pr[win|b]+P r [ win|g] < 1
⇐⇒ Pr[win,b]+P r [ win,g] < 1/2 ⇐⇒ Pr[win] < 1/2 (45)
31where we have used the pure evaluation skill restriction Pr[q|θ]=P r [ q], the symmetry restrictions that
Pr[win|s,g] − Pr[win|u,g]=P r [ win|u,b] − Pr[win|s,b]a n dP r [ b]=P r [ g]=1 /2, and the evaluation skill




















⇐⇒ Pr[win|g] < Pr[lose|b], (46)





















which holds since the LHS is negative and the RHS is positive.





























⇐⇒ Pr[win|g]Pr[lose|g] ≥ Pr[win|b]Pr[lose|b]
⇐⇒ Pr[win|g](1 − Pr[win|g]) ≥ Pr[win|b](1 − Pr[win|b])
⇐⇒ Pr[win|g] − Pr[win|b] ≥ Pr[win|g]2 − Pr[win|b]2
⇐⇒ Pr[win|g] − Pr[win|b] ≥ (Pr[win|g] − Pr[win|b])(Pr[win|g]+P r [ win|b]) (50)
where we have used the symmetry restriction Pr[win|s,g] − Pr[win|u,g]=P r [ win|u,b] − Pr[win|s,b]a n d
where the ﬁnal inequality holds for Pr[win] < 1/2s i n c eP r [ win|g]+P r [ win|b] < 1a ss h o w na b o v e .
32Finally, regarding condition (44), note that for Pr[g]=P r [ b] the pure evaluation skill restriction that
Pr[s|g]=P r [ s|b] implies Pr[s,g]=P r [ s,b], which is equivalent to
Pr[win,g]Pr[s|win,g]+P r [ lose,g]Pr[s|lose,g]) = Pr[win,b]Pr[s|win,b]+P r [ lose,b]Pr[s|lose,b]
⇐⇒ Pr[win|g]Pr[s|win,g]+P r [ lose|g]Pr[s|lose,g]) = Pr[win|b]Pr[s|win,b]+P r [ lose|b]Pr[s|lose,b]
⇐⇒ (Pr[win|g] − Pr[win]+P r [ win])Pr[s|win,g]+( P r [ lose|g] − Pr[lose]+P r [ lose])Pr[s|lose,g]
=( P r [ win|b] − Pr[win]+P r [ win])Pr[s|win,b]+( P r [ lose|b] − Pr[lose]+P r [ lose])Pr[s|lose,b]
⇐⇒ (Pr[win|g] − Pr[win])Pr[s|win,g]+( P r [ lose|g] − Pr[lose])Pr[s|lose,g]
−(Pr[win|b] − Pr[win])Pr[s|win,b] − (Pr[lose|b] − Pr[lose])Pr[s|lose,b]
=P r [ win]Pr[s|win,b]+P r [ lose]Pr[s|lose,b] − Pr[win]Pr[s|win,g] − Pr[lose]Pr[s|lose,g]. (51)
Therefore (44) holds if
(Pr[win|b] − Pr[win])Pr[s|win,b]+( P r [ lose|b] − Pr[lose])Pr[s|lose,b]
≥ (Pr[win|g] − Pr[win])Pr[s|win,g]+( P r [ lose|g] − Pr[lose])Pr[s|lose,g]
⇐⇒ (Pr[win] − Pr[win|b])(Pr[s|lose,b] − Pr[s|win,b])
≥ (Pr[win|g] − Pr[win])(Pr[s|win,g] − Pr[s|lose,g])
⇐⇒ Pr[s|lose,b] − Pr[s|win,b] ≥ Pr[s|win,g] − Pr[s|lose,g] (52)
where we have used the implication from Pr[g]=P r [ b]t h a tP r [ win] − Pr[win|b]=P r [ win|g] − Pr[win].
The ﬁnal inequality is the same condition as (43), so π<0f o rP r [ win] < 1/2. By the same arguments
π>0f o rP r [ win] > 1/2.
Now consider the both-gamble equilibrium. By the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 1,
the D1 reﬁnement requires that the observer believe an unexpected deviation to not gambling is by type
θ = b. Therefore the risk premium πθ is negative if
Pr[win|θ]v(Pr[s|win]) + Pr[lose|θ]v(Pr[s|lose])
> Pr[win|θ]v(Pr[s|win,b]) + Pr[lose|θ]v(Pr[s|lose,b]). (53)
Since Pr[s|win]=P r [ s|lose]=P r [ s] in the both-gamble equilibrium of a pure evaluation skill gamble, this
is equivalent to
v(Pr[s]) > Pr[win|θ]v(Pr[s|win,b]) + Pr[lose|θ]v(Pr[s|lose,b]). (54)
For θ = b this holds for v00 < 0s i n c eP r [ win|b]Pr[s|win,b]+P r [ lose|b]Pr[s|lose,b]=P r [ s,win|b]+
Pr[s,lose|b]=P r [ s|b]=P r [ s]. Using this result, for v00 < 0 this also holds for θ = g if
Pr[win|g]v(Pr[s|win,b]) + Pr[lose|g]v(Pr[s|lose,b])
< Pr[win|b]v(Pr[s|win,b]) + Pr[lose|b]v(Pr[s|lose,b])
⇐⇒ (Pr[win|g] − Pr[win|b])v(Pr[s|win,b]) < (Pr[win|g] − Pr[win|b])v(Pr[s|lose,b])
⇐⇒ v(Pr[s|win,b]) <v (Pr[s|lose,b]) (55)

















which holds by the pure evaluation skill assumption Pr[win|s,b] < Pr[win|u,b]. Therefore πθ < 0.
Now consider the neither-gamble equilibrium. In this case the D1 reﬁnement requires that the observer
believe an unexpected deviation to gambling is by type θ = g so the risk premium πθ is positive if
Pr[win|θ]v(Pr[s|win]) + Pr[lose|θ]v(Pr[s|lose])
< Pr[win|θ]v(Pr[s|win,g]) + Pr[lose|θ]v(Pr[s|lose,g]). (57)
By similar logic as the both-gamble case, for v00 < 0t h i sh o l d sf o rt y p eθ = g,a n df o rv00 < 0a n dv0 > 0i t
















which holds by the evaluation skill assumption Pr[win|s,g] > Pr[win|u,b]. Therefore πθ > 0. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 :Consider a single gamble P and let F = P(q,x|θ = b)a n dG = P(q,x|θ = g).
Then applying our results on risk premia for diﬀerent types facing a single gamble, in the separating
equilibrium, the risk premium is higher for the F gamble than the G gamble if, from (4) and (5),
v(Pr[s|b]) − E[v(Pr[s|x,g])|b] >v (Pr[s|b]) − E[v(Pr[s|x,g])|g]
⇐⇒ E[v(Pr[s|x,g])|b] <E [v(Pr[s|x,g])|g]
⇐⇒ Pr[win|b]v(Pr[s|win,g]) + Pr[lose|b]v(Pr[s|lose,g])
< Pr[win|g]v(Pr[s|win,g]) + Pr[lose|g]v(Pr[s|lose,g])
⇐⇒ (Pr[win|b] − Pr[win|g])v(Pr[s|win,g])
< (Pr[lose|g] − Pr[lose|b])v(Pr[s|lose,g])
⇐⇒ (Pr[win|b] − Pr[win|g])v(Pr[s|win,g])
< (Pr[win|b] − Pr[win|b])v(Pr[s|lose,g])
⇐⇒ (Pr[win|b] − Pr[win|g])(v(Pr[s|win,g]) − v(Pr[s|lose,g])) < 0 (59)
where the ﬁnal inequality holds for v0 > 0s i n c eP r [ win|g] > Pr[win|b]a n dP r [ s|win,g] > Pr[s|lose,g].
34In the both-gamble equilibrium, the risk premium is weakly higher for the F gamble than the G gamble
if, from (8),
v(Pr[s|b]) − E[v(Pr[s|x])|b] ≥ v(Pr[s|b]) − E[v(Pr[s|x])|g]
⇐⇒ E[v(Pr[s|x])|g] ≤ E[v(Pr[s|x])|b]
⇐⇒ Pr[win|b]v(Pr[s|win]) + Pr[lose|b]v(Pr[s|lose])
≤ Pr[win|g]v(Pr[s|win]) + Pr[lose|g]v(Pr[s|lose])
⇐⇒ (Pr[win|b] − Pr[win|g])(v(Pr[s|win]) − v(Pr[s|lose])) ≤ 0 (60)
where the ﬁnal inequality holds for v0 > 0s i n c eP r [ win|g] > Pr[win|b]a n dP r [ s|win] ≥ Pr[s|lose].
In the neither-gamble equilibrium, the risk premium is higher for the F gamble than the G gamble if,
from (9),
v(Pr[s]) − E[v(Pr[s|x,g])|b] >v (Pr[s]) − E[v(Pr[s|x,g])|g] (61)
which holds by the same arguments as for the separating equilibrium. ¥
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